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CEPA: A LAWFUL FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT UNDER "ONE COUNTRY,
Two CUSTOMS TERRITORIES? '
Wei Wang*
I. INTRODUCTION
HE Mainland China and Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) 1 is the
first Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Mainland China and
one of its separate customs territories, the Hong Kong Special Adminis-
trative Region (HKSAR). It is also the first regional trade agreement
between two customs territories of one country to be created under the
framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The conclusion of
the CEPA raises new issues for both international law and Chinese do-
mestic law. This article focuses on the legal status of the CEPA, that is
whether the CEPA is a lawful agreement when looked at from interna-
tional law and domestic law perspectives. First, the article introduces the
background and negotiating history of the CEPA. Second, it gives an
overview of the structure of the CEPA. Third, it discusses the nature and
the legal status of the CEPA. And fourth, it provides some general sug-
gestions for amending relevant People's Republic of China (PRC) laws in
order to legalize the trade agreement under the one country, two customs
territories arrangement.
II. BACKGROUND AND NEGOTIATING HISTORY OF
THE CEPA
A. BACKGROUND
At the end of the 1970s, the PRC adopted a policy of reform and in-
creasing openness. Since then, an economic and trade relationship has
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1. Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement between China and Hong Kong,
China, Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Jan. 20, 2004, WTO Doc. WT/
REG162/1, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen-home.asp?language=1&_=1
[hereinafter CEPA].
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developed between Hong Kong and China,2 laying the economic ground
for establishing a free trade area.3 After China's resumption of sover-
eignty over Hong Kong in July 1997, this economic relationship has been
strengthened, especially with respect to the trade between Hong Kong
and Guangdong Province. From 1997 to 2002, the direct trade volume
between Hong Kong and Guangdong was more than USD $200 billion.4
The impact of the Asian financial crisis at the end of the 1990s, the terror-
ist attacks of 9/11, and the unexpected Severe Acute Respiratory Syn-
drome (SARS) outbreak in early 2003, however, dealt a heavy blow to
Hong Kong's economy, leaving it in need of new stimulus. Meanwhile,
facing challenges from other Asian areas, the cooperation between Hong
Kong and Guangdong needs a second niche. 5 After resumption of sover-
eignty over Hong Kong, Chinese leaders have been unwilling to recognize
the region's problems. While the impetus for this may be political, eco-
nomic, or both, they nonetheless support any plan to drive Hong Kong's
economy.6 The CEPA embodies this type of support from the PRC Cen-
tral Government to Hong Kong (and Macao). 7
The second backdrop against which to consider the CEPA is China's
entry into the WTO. 8 It is commonly recognized that China's WTO entry
has precipitated a movement toward regional trade integration between
2. See TRADE POLICY REVIEW BODY, TRADE POLICY REVIEW, HONG KONG, CHINA
REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT 25-26 (WTO, Report No. WT/TPR/G/109,
2002), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen-home.asp?language=I&_=1
[hereinafter TRADE POLICY] (stating that China is Hong Kong's largest trading
partner and has for decades been Hong Kong's principal supplier of imports, the
largest re-export market and one of the largest domestic export markets, and that
in 2001, China accounted for 40.3 percent of Hong Kong's total merchandise
trade).
3. Zhao Jinping, Focusing on the "Two Sides Arrangement," LIAOWANG NEWS
WKLY., June 30, 2003, at 14.
4. People's Daily Online, Trade between Guangdong, Hong Kong Brisk in First Quar-
ter: Despite the Influence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), South
China's Guangdong Province Still Boasts a Brisk Trade with Hong Kong, at http://
english.people.com.cn/200304/14/eng20030414_l15134.shtml (last updated Apr. 14,
2003); Chen Zuoer, Address at the Annual Conference of the 21st Century Forum
(Dec. 18, 2003), available at http://www. Szed.com/nl/ca684774.htm.
5. Press Release, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Speech by the Chief
Executive (July 24, 2001), available at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general!200107/
24/0724346.htm; Chen Zuoer, Address at a News Conference (June 28, 2003),
available at http://www.southcn.com/news/hktwma/shizheng/200306290164.htm
[hereinafter Zuoer Address].
6. See Zuoer Address, supra note 5.
7. General Office of the State Council, The Notice on Relevant Works for Imple-
menting the CEPA, GUOBANFA [2003] No. 95, para. 1(2) (2003) [hereinafter Im-
plementing the CEPA]; Wen: CEPA is Special Arrangement under "One Country,
Two Systems" Principle, XINHHUANET NEWS AGENCY, June 29, 2003, available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-06/29/content_943706.htm (discussing ad-
dress by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao a meeting with the Hong Kong People after
his presence at the signature ceremony of the CEPA).
8. See Protocol on Accession of the People's Republic of China, Notification of Ac-
ceptance and Entry into Force, Nov. 20, 2001, WTO Doc. WLI/100, available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen-home.asp?language=l&_=t (noting that on Novem-
ber 11, 2001, the People's Republic of China accepted the Protocol on Accession
of the People's Republic of China).
China and its neighbors.9 In tracing the history of China's foreign trade
over the last two decades, one can see that the PRC has adopted a two-
step foreign trade strategy which focuses on multilateralism before re-
gionalism or bilateralism (that is first enter the WTO, then enter into
FTAs). 1  Current Chinese foreign trade policy is a mixture of multilater-
alism and regionalism. For many years, the PRC's focus had been on its
reentry into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
(before 1995) and its accession into.the WTO (after 1995).l1 Today,
China pays close attention to regional trade integration so that it can
maximize its trade benefits through a bifocal trade policy. The CEPA is a
result of a significant strategic decision made by the Central Committee
of the Communist Party and the State Council of the PRC government.1 2
In fact, for China, the CEPA has become an experiment in further devel-
oping regional economic cooperation.13 The establishment of two free
trade areas with Hong Kong and Macao arouses expectations of a uni-
form Greater China Free Trade Area 14 that would include Mainland
China, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. The probability of concluding a
free trade agreement between Mainland China and Taiwan, however, is
very low considering the fact that normal political relations have yet to be
established between the two areas.15
9. Wang Qin, Progress and Prospect of China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, I J. OF
XIAMEN U. (ARTS & SOCIAL SCIENCE EDITION) 85, 86 (2004).
10. See Quan Yi, A New Wave of Bilateral FTA in Asia-Pacific Region and China's
Strategic Choice, 4 DONGNAN XUESHU 75, 76-77 (2003).
11. From 1986 to 2001, China's foreign trade negotiations were mainly surrounding
the accession to the GATIV/VTO. For the history of China's WTO accession, see
Yang Guohua & Cheng Jin, The Process of China's Accession to the WTO, 4 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 297-328 (2001).
12. Implementing the CEPA, supra note 7, at para. 1(1). The State Council is the high-
est administrative agency and responsible for the National People's Congress and
its Standing Committee. See CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA arts. 85, 92 [hereinafter PRC CONSTITUTION].
13. Implementing the CEPA, supra note 7, at para. 2(5).
14. Liu Yi, Economic Co-operation Between Guangdong and Hong Kong Under the
CEPA, 6 GUANGDONG SHEHUI KEXUE 110, 113 (2003); Gao Konglian, The Key of
Signing a FTA or CEPA between the Two Sides of Taiwan Strait is to Seek Practica-
bility, ECON. DAILY, Nov. 14, 2003, available at http://news.kaoh.com.tw/show.
php?d=58; see Li Luoli, What is More Important than the CEPA? 7 KAIFANG
DAOBAO 5, 6 (2003); see also Merchants in Taiwan Hope that the Two Sides of the
Taiwan Strait Sign an Agreement Similar to the CEPA, available at http://news.
rednet.com.cn/Articles/2003/11/487666.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2004).
15. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, Taiwan Affairs Office of CPC Central
Committee, Taiwan Affairs Office of State Counsel are Authorized to Issue State-
ment on Cross-Straits Relations, available at http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.
asp?table=Headlines&title=Headlines&offset=50&mid=154 (last visited Aug. 31,
2004) (Chinese officials expressed a strong willingness to establish a CEPA-like
arrangement with Taiwan. On May 17, 2004, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the Cen-
tral Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Taiwan Affairs Office of
the State Council were authorized to issue a statement on Taiwan issues, in which
Mainland China first officially proposed to establish a closer economic partnership
arrangement based on reciprocity and mutual benefits with Taiwan. However, the
Authorized Statement set up several conditions for the free trade arrangement
with Taiwan, i.e. Taiwan leaders must recognize that Mainland China and Taiwan
are the same country, and Taiwan leaders must give up their push for indepen-
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The third background consideration is the Hong Kong government's
adoption of a "more open-minded approach in pursuing high-standard
FTAs."'1 6 For instance, Hong Kong began to negotiate a Closer Eco-
nomic Partnership (CEP) Agreement with New Zealand in May 2001.17
As a WTO Member, Hong Kong is convinced that free trade agreements
consistent with WTO rules can bring about an expansion of trade and
investment. 18 This belief was promoted by Hong Kong merchants, who,
before and after China's WTO entry, both expected to benefit more from
and worried about the possibility of losing the intermediate advantages
Hong Kong had enjoyed. The Hong Kong General Chamber of Com-
merce suggested to the Chief Executive of the HKSAR,19 Tung Chee
Hwa, that Hong Kong and Mainland China should study the FTA model
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).20 Under ap-
peals from merchants, scholars, and professionals,21 the idea of establish-
ing an FTA came to the mind of the HKSAR government. 22
B. NEGOTIATING HISTORY
On December 19, 2001, only one week after China became a WTO
member, the chief executive of the HKSAR, during his visit to Beijing,
proposed to establish an FIA between Mainland China and Hong
Kong.23 This suggestion received a positive response from China's cen-
tral government. On January 25, 2002, the Department of Finance of the
HKSAR and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
of the People's Republic of China (MOFTEC) held a first-round negotia-
dence); see Zhang Mingqing, Address at a news conference held by the Taiwan
Affairs Office of the State Council (May 24, 2004), available at http://www.bjstb.
gov.cn/IMAGES/GTBXWFBHlnew-page_31.htm (In a statement by Zhang Ming-
quing, the spokesman of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, the condi-
tions were simplified to one-realization of "direct, comprehensive and two-way
'three links' (Santong, i.e. mail link, transportation link and commerce link)").
16. TRADE POLICY, supra note 2, at 1 41.
17. At present (August 2004), the Hong Kong and New Zealand CEP Agreement is
still in negotiations.
18. TRADE POLICY, supra note 2, at 9 42.
19. Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Re-
public of China, Apr. 4, 1990, art. 43 (entered into force July 1, 1997), available at
http://www.info.gov.hk/basiclaw/fulltext [hereinafter HKSAR Basic Law] (The
Chief Executive is the administrative head of the HKSAR).
20. See CCGOV, The Big Events of the CEPA, available at http://www.ccgov.org.cn/
fgov/f0002/f2003070022.htm (Apr. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Big Events].
21. Chi Fulin, Zhongguo Ziyou Maoyiqu de Gouxiang [Conceiving a Chinese Free
Trade Area], Address at the Forum on the Change of Economic and Trade Rela-
tions between the Mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao after the
Mainland China and Taiwan's Entry to the WTO (Nov. 23, 2003), available at
http://www.homeoc.org.cn/wto/2shore4district/chinese%20free-trade%20area.htm;
see also Hu Angang, A Design of Free Trade Agreements between Three Countries
and Four Areas, China, HKSAR, Japan, and Korea, 3-4 Guoil JINGJI PINGLUN
[Int'l Econ. Rev.] 17-20 (2001).
22. See SZ News, The Origin of the CEPA, available at http://www.sznews.com/n/
ca407281.htm (June 30, 2003) [hereinafter Origin of the CEPA].
23. CEPA, supra note 1, fn. 1 (indicating that in the CEPA, Mainland China refers to
the entire customs territory of the People's Republic of China).
CEPA
tion to discuss the economic and trade arrangement, and formally name
the FTA "closer economic partnership arrangement. '24 The second-
round negotiation was convened on March 27, 2002. On November 28,
2002, the fourth meeting was held between the Hong Kong Trade and
Industry Department and the MOFTEC. On June 29, 2003, the main
body of the CEPA was signed and went into effect. Six Annexes to the
CEPA were signed and took effect on September 29, 2003. The initial
negotiating history of the CEPA totaled less than two years, evidencing a
new characteristic of current FTAs - speed.25 It also reflects the Chinese
central government's support of the HKSAR. During early 2003, the
SARS outbreak was so serious in Hong Kong and Mainland China that
some worried the CEPA negotiation process would be delayed. How-
ever, Chinese leaders decided to speed up the progress of the
negotiations. 26
According to article 3.2 of the CEPA, the CEPA negotiations should be
continuous to broaden its content. . On August 27, 2004, the two sides
reached an agreement to provide further liberalization measures on trade
in goods and services for the second stage of the CEPA (CEPA II). In
addition to the Mainland China and Hong Kong CEPA, there is another
CEPA between Mainland China and Macao, which was signed and took
effect on October 17, 2003, and which is, in fact, a virtually identical copy
of the CEPA between Mainland China and Hong Kong. In this article,
the term CEPA refers to the CEPA between Mainland China and Hong
Kong, unless otherwise stated.
The objectives of the CEPA are "to promote the joint economic pros-
perity and development of the Mainland and the Hong Kong Special Ad-
ministrative Region ... to facilitate the further development of economic
links between the two sides and other countries and regions, '27 and to
strengthen trade and investment cooperation between the two sides. 28 In
order to realize those purposes, three measures have been introduced: (1)
progressively reducing or eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers to
trade in goods; (2) progressively achieving liberalization of trade in ser-
vices through the reduction or elimination of discriminatory measures;
and (3) promoting trade and investment facilitation.29 According to the
CEPA, starting January 1, 2004, Mainland China would apply zero tariff
to some goods imported from Hong Kong.30 No later than January 1,
2006, Mainland China will apply zero tariff to all goods imported from
Hong Kong.31
24. Big Events, supra note 20.
25. Bin Jiancheng, Comparison and Reference of the New Generation FTAs, 5 JINGJI
SHEHUI TIZHi BUIAO [Comparison of Economic and Social Systems] 85-90 (2003).
26. Origin of the CEPA, supra note 22.
27. CEPA, supra note 1, pmbl.
28. Id. art. 1.
29. Id.
30. Id. art. 5.2.
31. Id. art. 5.3.
2004]
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The CEPA is not China's first try to establish a free trade area. During
the 2000 Singapore summit meeting between the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China, then Chinese Premier Zhu
Rongji proposed to establish an expert group to study the issue of re-
gional integration between the ASEAN and China. In May 2002, the first
meeting of the China-ASEAN negotiation Committee was held in Beij-
ing. On November 4, 2002, China and ten ASEAN members signed the
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation be-
tween ASEAN and the People's Republic of China (Framework Agree-
ment), with the purpose of establishing the ASEAN-China Free Trade
Area (ACFTA) within ten years. According to article 16 of the ACFTA
Framework Agreement, the Framework Agreement shall enter into force
on July 1, 2003. However, ASEAN countries and China did not complete
the internal procedures for the agreement to take effect prior to July 1,
2003. To date, the ACFTA Framework Agreement has not yet come into
force.32
III. STRUCTURE OF THE CEPA
The CEPA is composed of two parts. The first part is the main body of
the CEPA, which includes a Preamble and six Chapters (containing
twenty-three articles). Chapter 1 mainly stipulates the five principles of
the CEPA. The first principle is to abide by the "one country, two sys-
tems" ideology,33 the political and legal foundation of Hong Kong's re-
turn to China. The second principle is to be consistent with the rules of
the WTO. 34 The third principle is to satisfy the needs of both sides. 35
The fourth principle is to achieve reciprocity and mutual benefits, com-
plementarities, and joint prosperity.36 The fifth principle is to take pro-
gressive action, dealing with the easier subjects before the more difficult
ones. 37 Chapter 2 of the CEPA is related to trade in goods, dealing with
tariffs, tariff rate quota and non-tariff measures, anti-dumping measures,
subsidies and countervailing measures, and safeguards. Chapter 3 pro-
vides rules of origin. Chapter 4 covers trade in services, including five
articles on market access, service suppliers, financial cooperation, cooper-
ation in tourism, and mutual recognition of professional qualifications.
Chapter 5 is concerned with trade and investment facilitation. Chapter 6
contains other provisions, such as exceptions, institutional arrangements,
32. The ACFTA Framework Agreement is available at http://www.aseansec.org/13196.
htm. For the difficulties of the ACFTA Framework Agreement, see Wang Weiyi,
The Difficulties and Prospects of China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, 10 DANGDAI
YATAI [Contemporary Asia and Pacific] 26-29 (2003) (The barriers to establishing
the ACFTA include, inter alia, a small market volume between the ASEAN and
China, similar economic structures, political disputes (especially the dispute on the
South China Sea), and the challenges from Korea and Japan).
33. CEPA, supra note 1, art. 2.1.
34. Id. art. 2.2.
35. Id. art. 2.3.
36. Id. art. 2.4.
37. Id. art. 2.5.
and amendments. One of the Vice Ministers of Commerce of the PRC,
An Min, and the Financial Secretary of the HKSAR, Antony Leung, as
representatives of Mainland China and the HKSAR, signed the main
body of the CEPA.
The second part contains six annexes. Annex 1 is entitled Arrange-
ments for Implementation of Zero Tariff for Trade in Goods. Annex 2 is
entitled Rules of Origin for Trade in Goods. Annex 3 is entitled Proce-
dures for the Issuing and Verification of Certificates of Origin. Annex 4
is entitled Specific Commitments on Liberalization of Trade in Services,
including nine paragraphs and two tables. Table 1 (Mainland China's
Specific Commitments on Liberalization of Trade in Services to Hong
Kong) provides that, starting January 1, 2004, China shall open certain
service sectors, including legal services, accounting, auditing and book-
keeping services, architectural services, engineering services, integrated
engineering services, urban planning and landscape architectural services,
medical and dental services, real estate services, advertising services,
management consulting services, convention services and exhibition ser-
vices, telecommunication services, audiovisual services, construction and
related engineering services, distribution services, financial services (in-
surance, banking and securities services), tourism and travel related ser-
vices, and transport services. Table 2 (Hong Kong's Specific
Commitments on Liberalization of Trade in Services to the Mainland
China) has not been made yet.38 Annex 5 is entitled Definition of 'Ser-
vice Suppliers' and Related Requirements. Annex 6 is entitled Trade and
Investment Facilitation. The six Annexes form an integral part of the
CEPA.39
Moreover, the CEPA II reached in August 2004, as supplement to and
part of the CEPA, contains the Record of Consultations on Further Lib-
eralization under the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Part-
nership Arrangement, and two Annexes. Annex 1 is the Second Batch of
Hong Kong Origin Products for Implementation of Zero Import Tariff;
Annex 2 is Sepcific Contents on Further Liberalization of Trade in Ser-
vices for Hong Kong. According to the CEPA II, Mainland China shall
apply zero tariff to products under 713 Mainland 2004 Tariff Codes, and
provide more preferential treatment to relevant services from Hong
Kong.
It is noteworthy that the main body of the CEPA, its six Annexes, and
the CEPA II are written in the Chinese language, 40 so the Chinese ver-
38. According to paragraph 6 of Annex 4, the two sides will formulate and implement
liberalization of Hong Kong's service sectors for the Mainland China and the rele-
vant specific commitments will be listed in Table 2. The temporary unilateral ben-
efit to Hong Kong embodies the support of the PRC Central Government to the
HKSAR. See id. Annex 4.
39. Id. art. 21.
40. Id. art. 23, Annex 1 $ 7, Annex 2 12, Annex 3 113, Annex 4 1 9, Annex 5 1 9,
Annex 6 9 11. See also the Record of Consultations on Further Liberalization
under the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement,
% 4, available at www.tid.gov.hklenglish/cepa/files/RoC e.DOC.
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sion of the CEPA is the official version.
IV. LEGAL STATUS OF THE CEPA
Unlike other closer economic partnership agreements,4 1 the CEPA
does not directly use the word agreement or treaty, but instead uses the
word arrangement. Although the designation given to an agreement is
"legally irrelevant" per se,42 and the term arrangement may also be used
as the term of treaty,43 it may be meaningful under certain circumstances.
More significantly, another free trade agreement which is under negotia-
tions between Hong Kong and New Zealand is entitled Closer Economic
Partnership Agreement 4 4 not Closer Economic Partnership Arrange-
ment." Is there any reason for the special wording of the CEPA? Is the
difference of the wording intentional?
From the negotiating history of the CEPA, it appears the use of the
term "arrangement" was the result of an understanding between Main-
land China and HKSAR negotiators that most FTAs in the world are
preferential agreements among states, while the negotiated trade agree-
ment between Mainland China and the HKSAR was under one country,
China. Therefore, based on the principle of the "one country, two sys-
tems,' 45 the agreement was entitled arrangement. 4 6 So the use of the
term arrangement, instead of agreement, is intentional, which leads to
another question: Does it imply a different legal status of the CEPA?
From an international law standpoint, "states cannot avoid an instru-
41. See, e.g., Agreement Between New Zealand and Singapore on a Closer Economic
Partnership, November 14, 2000, N.Z.-Sing., available at http://www.fta.gov.sg/fta/
pdf/anzscep.pdf.
42. JAN KLABBERS, THE CONCEPT OF TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 (Kluwer
Law International, 1996); see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,
1969, art. 2(1)(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/
treaties.htm [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see also LASSA OPPENHEIM, OPPEN-
HELM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, PEACE in Part 2 to 4, § 586, at 1208 (Robert Jen-
nings & Arthur Watts eds., Longman, 9th ed. 1992).
43. LORD McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 24 (Oxford University Press 1961); GER-
HARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUcTION TO PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 490 (Macmillan Publishing Co., 5th ed. 1986); J.G. STARKE & I.A.
SHEARER, STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 401-02 (Butterworths, 11th ed. 1994)
(discussing that an arrangement is an instrument less formal than a treaty and it is
more usually employed for a transaction of a provisional or temporary nature).
44. TRADE POLICY, supra note 2, 44.
45. See CEPA, supra note 1, art. 2.1 (The "one country, two systems" policy is in the
preamble of the HKSAR Basic Law and it is incorporated into the CEPA as a
leading principle of the arrangement).
46. Origin of the CEPA, supra note 22. See also Zeng Lingliang, On the Legal Status
and Development Trend of Regional Trade Arrangement under the WTO: Several
Legal Issues Concerning Establishment of Free Trade Areas among Three Territo-
ries of China, in A TOPIC OF GENERAL INTEREST CONCERNING CHINA'S TRADE
LAw: NEW LEGAL ISSUES BETWEEN THE Two SIDES ACROSS THE TAIWAN
STRAITS, HONG KONG AND MACAO 204, 216 (Sun Wanzhong ed., China Renmin
Gong'an University Press 2004) (stating that the reason of using the wording of
closer economic partnership arrangement, rather than free trade agreement, is
political).
CEPA
ment being a treaty merely by giving it a title suggesting otherwise, ' 47 so
it is a little hasty to make a conclusion that the CEPA is not an interna-
tional agreement just because of its special title. In order to know the
legal status of the CEPA, it is necessary to look at two sides. One side is
the place of the CEPA under international law. The other side is the
place of the CEPA under PRC domestic law and HKSAR domestic law,
especially those laws authorizing the conclusion of treaties, which are
called constitutional requirements for the validity of treaties.A Neverthe-
less, the precondition to identify the legal status of the CEPA is to clarify
its nature.
A. NATURE OF THE CEPA
The terms free trade agreement or free trade area cannot be found in
the main body of the CEPA and its six annexes, which may raise the ques-
tion of whether the CEPA is an FTA. In some Chinese scholars' view, the
CEPA is not an FTA, but rather a new type of regional trade agreement
under the WTO framework, a so-called creation.49 In my view, although
the CEPA lacks explicit FTA wording, the nature of the CEPA indicates
that it is nonetheless an FTA.
First, from the perspective of content, the CEPA provides that Main-
land China and Hong Kong will apply zero tariffs to goods imported from
each other,50 which complies with the main characteristic of an FTA.
Second, from the perspective of form, the CEPA was introduced to the
WTO in the name of an FIA. On December 27, 2003, China and Hong
Kong introduced the CEPA to the WTO (Committee on Regional Trade
Agreements and the Council for Trade in Services) based on article
XXIV(7)(a) of the GATT 1994, and article V(7)(a) of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the two parties requested
that the CEPA should be circulated to the WTO Members. 51 The notifi-
cation clearly states that the purpose of the CEPA is to establish "a free
trade area" within the meaning of GATT article XXIV and GATS article
V.52 On the same day Mainland China and Hong Kong introduced their
CEPA, China and Macao gave a similar notice to the WTO about the
CEPA between China and Macao, also including the wording of "a free
47. OPPENHEIM, supra note 42, at 1209.
48. See B. SEN, A DIPLOMAT'S HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRAcrcE
560 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 3d ed. 1988); see also McNAIR, supra note 43, at
59-60.
49. Zeng Huaqun, Some New Problems to be Researched in the Field of International
Economic Law, 26 FAXUE YANJIU [Chinese Journal of Law] 135 (2004); see also
Weng Guomin & Wang Ling, Some Legal Issues on the Mainland - Hong Kong
Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement under WTO Rules, 34 J. OF ZHEJIANG
U. (HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES EDrrION) 37, 39 (2004).
50. CEPA, supra note 1, art. 5.
51. Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Council for Trade in Servies, Closer
Economic Partnership Agreement between China and Hong Kong, China: Notifica-
tion from the Parties, WTO Doc. WT/REG162/N/1, S/C/N/264 (Jan. 12, 2004).
52. Id.
2004]
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trade area."' 53 Third, in an official document made by the General Office
of the PRC State Council, the CEPA is deemed an agreement to establish
a free trade area. 54 Fourth, in WTO practice, the CEPA has been re-
garded as an FTA also. For example, in a meeting of the Council for
Trade in Goods of the WTO held in January 2004, the two CEPAs (one
with Hong Kong, the other with Macao) were deemed to be regional
trade agreements and were treated together with two other FTAs. 55 Both
Mainland China and Hong Kong have not indicated any intention to cre-
ate a new type of regional trade agreement. In fact, the CEPA neither
breaks through the scope of GATT Article XXIV, nor creates a new type
of regional trade agreement which is inconsistent with the WTO.56 On all
accounts, the CEPA is an FTA in nature.
B. POSITION OF THE CEPA UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
According to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vi-
enna Convention), a treaty is "an international agreement concluded be-
tween States in written form and governed by international law, whether
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments
and whatever its particular designation. ' 57 Although the Vienna Con-
vention does not preclude non-state subjects from concluding a treaty,58
it is generally acknowledged that the subjects of concluding treaties are
states and international organizations. 59 So far, there has been no inter-
national rule allowing two regions under one state to conclude treaties.
It seems that the CEPA, under the Vienna Convention accepted by
53. Council for Trade in Goods, Council for Trade in Services, Closer Economic Part-
nership Agreement between China and Macao, China: Notification from the Parties,
WTO Doc. WT/REG163/N/1, S/C/N/265 (Jan. 12, 2004).
54. See Implementing the CEPA, supra note 7, at para.l(1).
55. See Council for Trade in Goods, Minutes of the Meeting of the Council for Trade in
Goods, para. 4, WTO Doc. GIC/M/72 (Jan. 26, 2004) (the other two free trade
agreements are the ETA between the United States and Singapore, and the EIA
between the United States and Chile).
56. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT'), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 33 I.L.M. 1125,
1154, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/region-e/regatt-e.htm [here-
inafter GAIT]. According to GATT article XXIV(5), there are three types of
regional trade agreements, i.e., free trade agreement, customs union agreement,
and interim agreement for the formation of a free trade area or a custom union.
57. Vienna Convention, supra note 42, art. 2(1)(a) (emphasis added).
58. See id. art. 3 (stating: "The fact that the present Convention does not apply to
international agreements concluded between States and other subjects of interna-
tional law or between such other subjects of international law, or to international
agreements not in written form, shall not affect: (a) the legal force of such
agreements").
59. See Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Identification and Character of Treaties and Treaty
Obligations Between States in International Law, 2002 BRIT Y.B. INT'L L. 141, 157;
see also KLABBERS, supra note 42, at 48; GLAHN, supra note 43, at 507; PAUL
REUTER, INTRODUCriON TO THE LAW OF TREATtES 27, para. 77 (Jose Mico et al.
trans., Pinter Publishers 1989); STARK & SHEARER, supra note 43, at 404; 1986
Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties between States and International
Organizations or between International Organizations (not yet effective).
both the PRC and the HKSAR,60 is not a treaty because it is not con-
cluded between States. One side, Mainland China is the main body of the
PRC.61 Another side, the HKSAR, is a Special Administrative Region of
the PRC, with a high degree of autonomy.62 Historically, the PRC re-
sumed its sovereignty over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997, according to the
Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Re-
public of China on the Question of Hong Kong (Sino-British Joint Decla-
ration) concluded on December 19, 1984,63 which is a treaty between the
PRC and the United Kingdom.64 The legal status of Hong Kong was an-
nounced in the Sino-British Joint Declaration as being "directly under the
authority of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic
of China, '65 and this status is further confirmed in the constitutional doc-
ument of Hong Kong, i.e. the HKSAR Basic Law. 66
The economic foundation of establishing an FTA between Mainland
China and the HKSAR is that each side has a different customs system.
Hong Kong's status of a separate customs territory has long been af-
firmed by the GATT and the WTO. Unlike the United Nations, whose
members should be states, 67 the WTO is composed of both states and
separate customs territories.68 John H. Jackson pointed out that "full na-
tion-state 'sovereignty' is not a condition of [GATT and WTO] member-
60. See Dep't of Justice of the HKSAR, List of Treaties in Force and Applicable to the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, available at http://www.justice.gov.hk/
interlaw-e.htm (last updated Aug. 19, 2004) (note that the PRC submitted a docu-
ment acceding to the Vienna Convention on May 9, 1997, which took effect to
China on October 3, 1997, and further note that the Vienna Convention is also
applicable to the HKSAR).
61. See CEPA, supra note 1, fn.1; see also Implementing the CEPA, supra note 7, at
para. 1(1). In the CEPA, Mainland China refers to the entire customs territory of
the PRC. In the Notice of the General Office of the State Council, the CEPA is
described as an arrangement between the main body of a state and its separate
custom territory.
62. HKSAR Basic Law, supra note 19, arts. 1-2.
63. Sino-British Joint Declaration, Dec. 19, 1984, U.K.-P.R.C., 9 9 1-2, available at
http://www.info.gov.hk/trans/d/d2.htm.
64. STARKE & SHEARER, supra note 43, at 403 (discussing the Sino-British Joint Dec-
laration as a "binding treaty arrangement"); RODA MUSHKAT, ONE COUNTRY,
Two INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITIES: THE CASE OF HONG KONG 140
(Hong Kong University Press 1997).
65. Sino-British Joint Declaration, supra note 63, 1 3(2).
66. HKSAR Basic Law, supra note 19, arts. 1-2 (article 1 states, "The Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region is an inalienable part of the People's Republic of
China"; article 2 states, "The National People's Congress authorizes the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region to exercise a high degree of autonomy and
enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final
adjudication, in accordance with the provisions of this Law").
67. U.N. CHARTER arts. 3-4(1), available at www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter2.htm
(last visited Aug. 31, 2004).
68. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing World Trade Organization, Dec. 15, 1993, art.
XII, 33 I.L.M. 13, 86-87, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/04-
wtoe.htm (stating "Any State or separate customs territory possessing full auton-
omy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters
provided for in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may ac-
cede to this Agreement").
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ship."'69 Hong Kong, as a separate customs territory, became a
contracting party of the GATT on April 23, 1986, after the United King-
dom declared Hong Kong to possess full autonomy respecting to external
commercial relations and to be a contracting party of the GATT accord-
ing to GATT article XXVI(5)(c). 7° Macao became a contracting party of
the GATT, also as a separate customs territory, on January 11, 1991, after
a similar declaration to GATT by the government of Portugal. 71 Since
January 1, 1995, Hong Kong and Macao have been WTO Members in the
name of Hong Kong, China and Macao, China.72 After their handover to
China,73 Hong Kong and Macao retained the status of separate customs
territories under China's sovereignty and the membership in the WTO.7 4
Under the WTO, a free trade area can be established between "two or
more customs territories. ' 75 According to article XXIV of the GATT
1994, a customs territory means "any territory with respect to which sepa-
rate tariffs or other regulations of commerce are maintained for a sub-
stantial part of the trade of such territory with other territories. '76
Because Mainland China and the HKSAR have two different customs
systems, they constitute two customs territories under the WTO. Accord-
ingly, the two contracting parties of the CEPA, as two different customs
territories in one sovereign state, could establish an FTA. However, the
possibility of concluding an FTA between two customs territories under
69. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JU-
RISPRUDENCE 48 (The Royal Institute of International Affairs 1998).
70. Id.; GATT7, supra note 56, art. XXVI(5)(c) (stating:
If any of the customs territories, in respect of which a contracting party has
accepted this Agreement, possesses or acquires full autonomy in the conduct
of its external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in
this Agreement, such territory shall, upon sponsorship through a declaration
by the responsible contracting party establishing the above-mentioned fact,
be deemed to be a contracting party.
Note that more than fifty nations received GATT membership according to GATT Article
XXIV(5)(c)).
71. See GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, GATT ACTIVITIES 1991: AN
ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE WORK OF THE GATT 101(Geneva 1991).
72. See WTO, Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tif-e/org6-e.htm (Apr. 23, 2004).
73. Midnight, July 1, 1997, Return of Hong Kong to Chinese Control, available at http://
www.night.net/rosie/0697-hongkong.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2004) (noting that
China resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997, and Macao on De-
cember 20, 1999).
74. See Sino-British Joint Declaration, supra note 63, 3(6) (relating to the status of
the separate customs territory of Hong Kong); see also HKSAR Basic Law, supra
note 19, art. 116 (also relating to the status of the separate customs territory of
Hong Kong); see Joint Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of
China and the Government of the Republic of Portugal on the Question of Macao,
Apr. 13, 1987, 2(8), available at http://www.fmcoprc.gov.mo/engiyglzlt53583.htm
(relating to the status of a separate customs territory of Macao); see also Basic Law
of the Macao Special Administrative Region (SAR), Mar. 31, 1993, art. 112, availa-
ble at http://www.imprensa.macau.gov.mo/bo/i/1999/leibasia/indexuk.asp [herein-
after Basic Law of Macao SAR] (also relating to the status of a separate customs
territory of Macao).
75. GATT, supra note 56, art. XXIV(8)(b).
76. Id. art. XXIV(2).
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the WTO does not mean the EIA is definitely an international agreement
under international law. Because the two parties (also two customs terri-
tories) of the CEPA are under one state, the CEPA is different from a
typical international agreement. Indeed, it is highly difficult, if not im-
possible, to find a basis in international law to give the CEPA the status
of a treaty. The question remains, however, whether it is possible to find
any domestic law basis for affording the CEPA the status of a treaty, or
more generally the status of an international agreement?
C. POSITION OF THE CEPA UNDER PRC DOMESTIC LAW
According to the PRC Constitution, 77 the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress (NPC) shall ratify treaties and important
agreements concluded with foreign states. 78 Treaties and important
agreements refer to:
* Treaties of friendship and cooperation, treaties of peace and
other treaties of a political nature;
* Treaties and agreements concerning territory and delimitation of
boundary lines;
" Treaties and agreements relating to judicial assistance and
extradition;
* Treaties and agreements which contain stipulations inconsistent
with the laws of the People's Republic of China;
* Treaties and agreements which are subject to ratification as
agreed by the contracting parties; [and]
" Other treaties and agreements subject to ratification.79
It is evident that the CEPA, if it is a treaty or important agreement,
does not belong to categories (1) through (5). Moreover, CEPA article
23 provides that the CEPA shall come into effect on the day of signature,
which is different from China's WTO accession agreement authorized by
the NPC Standing Committee before the conclusion of the accession pro-
tocol.80 The CEPA, as a free trade agreement, is also different from the
77. See PRC CONSTrrUTION art. 67 (note that the existing PRC Constitution was en-
acted in 1982 by the fifth NPC, and amended in 1988, 1993, 1999 and 2004) (also
note that, per PRC Constitution article 57, the NPC is the highest national institu-
tion, with the Standing Committee as its permanent organ).
78. See id. art. 67(14); see also Law of the People's Republic of China on the Proce-
dure of the Conclusion of Treaties, Dec. 28, 1990, art. 3(2), available at http://www.
fmprc.gov.cn/chn/wjb/zzjg/tyfls/tfsckzlk/xggnlf/t70826.htm [hereinafter PRC Treaty
Law] (passed by 17th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 7th NPC on Dec.
28, 1990, and entering into effect on the same day).
79. See PRC Treaty Law, supra note 78, art. 7.
80. See Zhang Naigen, On the Constitution Amendment in Treaty Ratification Process,
1 ZHENGZHI Yu FALV 17, 18 (2004). On August 25, 2000, the NPC Standing Com-
mittee passed a special decision authorizing the State Council to negotiate and sign
the WTO accession protocol, and the PRC President to ratify it. Although Part
1II(1) of the Protocol on Accession of the People's Republic of China (China Ac-
cession Protocol) provides that the protocol shall be open for acceptance by China
until January 1, 2002, on November 11, 2001, one day after the signature of the
China Accession Protocol, China's President at the time, Jiang Zemin, ratified the
Protocol without seeking further approval from the NPC Standing Committee.
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first free trade agreement that China signed with the ASEAN countries,
the ACFTA Framework Agreement. The latter requires internal ratifica-
tion procedures for its entry into force. 81 From the wording of CEPA
article 23, it is unnecessary to get ratification from the NPC or its Stand-
ing Committee because the CEPA took effect on the day of the signature.
More significantly, neither the NPC nor its Standing Committee gave the
CEPA prior or post authorization, and after the conclusion of the CEPA,
neither the NPC nor its Standing Committee raised an objection to it or
asked to review it. This acquiescence implies that the CEPA does not
belong to category (6) of the treaties and important agreements that are
subject to ratification. 82 Therefore, the CEPA is not a treaty or an impor-
tant agreement under China's legal system. Is the CEPA, however, an
unimportant international agreement?
In China, the law regulating conclusion of treaties is the Law of the
PRC on the Procedure of the Conclusion of Treaties, article 2 of which
provides, "This Law shall be applicable to bilateral or multilateral treaties
and agreements, and other instruments of the nature of a treaty or agree-
ment concluded between the People's Republic of China and foreign
states."'83 Beyond all doubts, Hong Kong, as a Special Administrative Re-
gion, is part of China and not a foreign state, which excludes the applica-
tion of the Law of the PRC on the Procedure of the Conclusion of
Treaties.
The only Chinese law directly related to the conclusion of free trade
agreements or other regional trade agreements is the Foreign Trade Law,
which was amended in 2004. 84 Article 5 of the Foreign Trade Law pro-
vides, "The People's Republic of China shall, based on the principle of
equality and mutual benefit, promote and develop trading relations with
other states and regions, conclude or join customs union agreements, free
trade agreements or other regional economic and trade agreements, join
Zhang Naigen argues, however, that the authorization of the NPC Standing Com-
mittee is in violation of the PRC Constitution because the PRC Constitution does
not provide that the Standing Committee has the power of prior ratification or
authorization of a treaty or important agreement.
81. See ACFTA Framework Agreement, supra note 32, art. 16(2). It must be pointed
out, however, that it is unclear whether the ACFTA is an important agreement
that should be ratified by the NPC Standing Committee, or merely an ordinary
international agreement that should be approved by the State Council.
82. See Jiang Guoqing, A Few Questions on International Law and International Trea-
ties, Fourteenth Law Lecture Held by the Standing Committee of the NPC, availa-
ble at http:/Iwww.people.com.cn/GB/14576/15097/2369578.html (Apr. 29, 2000)
(noting that, according to prevailing academic view, what "other treaties and
agreements subject to ratification" of category (6) include are subject to the deci-
sion of the NPC Standing Committee, and also noting that the NPC Standing
Committee did not make a decision to require the review or ratification of the
CEPA after its signature).
83. PRC Treaty Law, supra note 78, art. 2 (emphasis added).
84. See Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China, GAZETTE OF THE
STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONGRESS, Issue No. 4, at 247-53
(2004) (promulgated May 12, 1994, by the 7th meeting of the Standing Committee
of the 8th NPC; entered into force July 1, 1994; amended Apr. 6, 2004, by the 8th
meeting of the Standing Committee of the 10th NPC).
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regional trade organization. '8 5 It seems that the PRC may conclude
FTAs not only with states, but also with regions. Do the regions include
Special Administrative Regions like Hong Kong and Macao? While the
Foreign Trade Law does not define the concept of regions, article 69 of
the Foreign Trade Law expressly provides that the law does not apply to
Hong Kong or Macao. 86 Therefore, the Foreign Trade Law cannot be the
legal foundation for the conclusion of the CEPA, even though it is the
only direct legal source for China to conclude regional trade agreements.
On its face, the CEPA is an agency-to-agency agreement. The HKSAR
government agency responsible for signing the CEPA is the Department
of Finance of the HKSAR. The corresponding PRC government agency
is the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), which had obtained the au-
thorization from the State Council.8 7 Meanwhile, the MOFCOM has the
function of CEPA negotiations and implementation.8 8 This function also
comes from the authorization of the State Council.89 Therefore, the
CEPA could be regarded as an agreement between the PRC central gov-
ernment and the HKSAR government. According to article 3 of the Or-
ganization Law of the State Council of the PRC, the State Council shall
perform functions and powers authorized by the PRC Constitution.
However, the PRC Constitution does not empower the State Council to
conclude treaties or agreements with a Special Administrative Region.90
Thus, the State Council has no power to authorize the MOFCOM to con-
clude agreements with the HKSAR.91 Strictly speaking, the conclusion of
the CEPA is an act of ultra vires made by the State Council. Indeed,
there is no legal position of the CEPA under current Chinese domestic
law. In other words, the CEPA exists in a legal vacuum without constitu-
tional basis. Thus, it seems appropriate to say that the CEPA is de jure
invalid, although it is de facto effective.
85. Id, art. 5 (emphasis added).
86. Id. art. 43 (stating "This Law shall not apply to the separate customs territories of
the People's Republic of China").
87. See Implementing the CEPA, supra note 7, pmbl.
88. See Notification on Publication of the Main Functions and Internal Institutions of
Departments, Offices, and Bureaus in the MOFCOM, SHANGWUBU BANFA 12003]
No. 7 (2003) (noting that the internal institution of the MOFCOM responsible for
Hong Kong affairs is the Department of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao, one of
the main functions of which is to "play a leading role in organizing negotiations,
implementation and review of the CEPAs with Hong Kong and Macao, and other
economic communications and cooperations").
89. See Circular of the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Issuing the
Provisions on Main Functions, Internal Structure and Staffing of Members of the
Minsitry of Commerce, GUOBANFA [20031 No. 29, GAZETrE OF THE STATE COUN-
CIL OF THE P.R.C., Issue No. 17, at 24-28, para. 2(12) (2003) [hereinafter General
Office Circular].
90. PRC CONSTITUTION art. 89(9) (providing that the State Council has the right to
conclude treaties and agreements with foreign states).
91. See OPPENHIEM, supra note 42, at 1285 § 636 (under customary international law,
the validity of a treaty is questionable if it is reached in violation of constitutional
laws of one of the parties).
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D. POSITION OF THE CEPA UNDER HKSAR DOMESTIC LAW
The HKSAR has the capacity to conclude certain treaties and interna-
tional agreements in the name of Hong Kong, China. This capacity is first
guaranteed by paragraph 3(10) of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, and
further guaranteed by Annex 1 of the Sino-British Joint Declaration,
which states:
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own, us-
ing the name "Hong Kong, China", maintain and develop relations
and conclude and implement agreements with states, regions and rel-
evant international organisations in the appropriate fields, including
the economic, trade, financial and monetary, shipping, communica-
tions, touristic, cultural and sporting fields.92
Hong Kong's capacity to conclude agreements is further affirmed by
Hong Kong domestic law. Article 151 of the HKSAR Basic Law93 mir-
rors the excerpt above from Annex 1 of the Sino-British Joint
Declaration.
All of the above referenced legal documents allow the HKSAR to con-
clude certain kinds of agreements with states and regions, but the prob-
lem is that none have defined the domain of states or regions. There is no
question that the HKSAR has the full capacity to conclude trade agree-
ments with states such as France, Germany, or the United Kingdom, but
is the HKSAR able to conclude trade agreements with Mainland
China?94 If so, is Mainland China regarded as a "state" or a "region" in
the agreement? What is the legal status of such agreement under the
HKSAR legal framework? There is not a clear answer to these questions
in current Hong Kong law. In accordance with article 18 of the HKSAR
Basic Law, the laws applicable to Hong Kong include three parts: (1) the
HKSAR Basic Law; (2) the laws previously in force in Hong Kong before
the enactment of the HKSAR Basic Law;95 and (3) the laws enacted by
the legislature of the HKSAR. All of these sources fail to provide any
legal basis upon which an agreement between Mainland China and the
92. See Sino-British Joint Declaration, supra note 63, Annex 1 11.
93. See Lord Irvine's comment for the draft of the HKSAR Basic Law, in Martin C.
M. Lee, A Tale of Two Articles, in THE BASIC LAW AND HONG KONG'S FUTURE
309, 324 (Peter Wesley-Smith & Albert H Y Chen eds., Butterworths, 1988) (The
HKSAR Basic Law was enacted by the 3rd session of the 7th NPC on April 4,
1990, and took effect on July 1, 1990. Although the HKSAR Basic Law was not
enacted by the HKSAR legislature, it is the foundation of the HKSAR domestic
law).
94. Compare Basic Law of Macao SAR, supra note 74, art. 136, and HKSAR Basic
Law, supra note 19, art. 151 (both providing the respective territory power to con-
clude agreements with "states and regions and relevant international organiza-
tions" in respect of relevant fields, but both also leaving in question whether the
respective territory may conclude agreements with Mainland China).
95. See HKSAR Basic Law, supra note 19, art. 8 (stating, "The Laws previously in
force in Hong Kong, that is, the common law, rules of equity, ordinances,
subordinate legislation and customary law shall be maintained, except for any that
contravene this Law, and subject to any amendment by the legislature of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region").
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HKSAR can be established. Moreover, both the Sino-British Joint Dec-
laration and the HKSAR Basic Law provide that the HKSAR may use
the name of Hong Kong, China to conclude agreements with states, re-
gions, and international organizations. In the CEPA, however, the HK-
SAR is identified as a contracting party under the name HKSAR rather
than Hong Kong, China. This subtle difference in nominal designation
further increases the distance between the CEPA and the HKSAR Basic
Law.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS: SUGGESTIONS FOR A
LAWFUL CEPA
The prevailing academic view is that "there cannot be bilateral treaties
between China and the HKSAR. ''96 After excluding the possibility of an
international agreement between Mainland China and Hong Kong, it is
evident that the CEPA is merely an interregional agreement within one
country. Even so, no legal basis exists for the conclusion of interregional
agreements between Mainland China and its Special Administrative Re-
gions. Although Chinese scholars generally take the view that the CEPA
is not an international agreement, 97 few raise doubts about its legal valid-
ity. On the contrary, the CEPA is highly acclaimed as a creation in
China,98 but unfortunately, such a creation is not likely to create legal
validity for itself.
It seems that the issue of concluding agreements between the HKSAR
and Mainland China was beyond the considerations of Chinese and Brit-
ish negotiators when they negotiated conditions for the handover of
Hong Kong from the United Kingdom to China, and it was also outside
the thoughts of the draftsmen of the HKSAR Basic Law. The HKSAR
Basic Law does not provide domestic law origin to satisfy the constitu-
tional requirements of the validity of agreements between Mainland
China and the HKSAR. Moreover, although the HKSAR Basic Law is
only applicable to the territory of Hong Kong, it is also well known in
Mainland China because Mainland China enacted it. Therefore, the lack
of interregional-agreement-making capacity for both Mainland China and
the HKSAR is manifest to each other.99 In such case, because the con-
clusion of the CEPA is unlawful, both internationally and domestically,
the CEPA has to be deemed an unlawful interregional FITA, except under
the framework of the WTO, which allows two separate customs territo-
96. ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 328 (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2000).
97. Huaqun, supra note 49, at 135; Mu Yaping & Lin Hao, Defining Hong Kong Com-
pany: Problems and Criteria in the Definition of Hong Kong Company, 11 GuoJi
MAOYI [INTERTRADE] 43, 44 (2003).
98. Huaqun, supra note 49, at 135; Guomin & Ling, supra note 49, at 39.
99. Vienna Convention, supra note 42, art. 46 (providing that a state may not claim its
consent of concluding a treaty invalid due to violation of its internal law, unless the
violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental
importance).
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ries to establish an FTA, provided the FTA is consistent with GATT arti-
cle XXIV and GATS article V.
If the conclusion of the CEPA is unlawful due to contractual incapacity
of the two sides of the agreement, then another question arises: What is
the legal basis of applying the CEPA in Mainland China and the HKSAR
under the principle of "one country, two systems?" On the one hand,
since the CEPA is not an international agreement, it is not China's duty
to implement it. On the other hand, because the CEPA cannot be con-
ferred legal status under existing domestic law of the PRC and.the HK-
SAR, it is not the legal duty of the PRC or the HKSAR to implement the
arrangement either. The realistic basis for implementing the CEPA in
Mainland China and Hong Kong seems to be the wills of the political
leaders, especially from the PRC central government's strong determina-
tion to support the economic stability and prosperity of the HKSAR.
Nevertheless, an overemphasis on political purpose without regard to le-
gal feasibility is a departure from China's newly established rule of law. 100
For the purpose of legalizing the CEPA and future agreements be-
tween Mainland China and the HKSAR, this article brings forward the
following options. The first option is to amend the PRC Constitution. As
discussed in the previous section, the NPC Standing Committee merely
ratifies treaties and important agreements with foreign states. The
CEPA, as an FTA in nature, concerns China's fundamental foreign trade
policy, and the commitments in the CEPA are deeper and broader than
China's commitments in the WTO. Accordingly, the CEPA will have a
great impact on China's existing laws, although not as much as the WTO.
In the notice issued by the General Office of the State Council, entitled
the Notice on Relevant Works for Implementing the CEPA,1° 1 the State
Council requires that the existing policy and rules should be "adjusted
and revised" according to the CEPA,10 2 which clearly indicates the im-
portance of the CEPA. Therefore, the PRC Constitution may include
free trade agreements in important agreements, and broaden the agree-
ment-making subjects to include Special Administrative Regions, as well
as foreign states. One potential issue of this option is that it may weaken
the authority of the NPC or the principle of "one country, two systems"
because it may bring the HKSAR and Mainland China on an equal foot-
ing. A standby option is to regard FTAs as ordinary agreements, which
are subject to the approval of the State Council. This standby option also
needs an amendment to the PRC Constitution in order to include agree-
ments with Special Administrative Regions. 103
100. See PRC CONSTrrUTION art. 5 (stating, "The People's Republic of China adopts
the rule of law and establishes a socialist country with the rule of law"; this provi-
sion was added to the PRC Constitution through an amendment passed by the 2nd
plenary session of the 9th NPC on March 15, 1999).
101. Implementing the CEPA, supra note 7.
102. Id. para. 2(2).
103. See PRC CONSTrrUTION art. 89(9) (providing that the State Council is responsible
for concluding treaties and agreements with foreign states).
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The second option is to make amendments to the HKSAR Basic Law.
The existing article 151 of the HKSAR Basic Law merely provides that
the HKSAR may conclude agreements with states, regions, and relevant
international organizations in the name of Hong Kong, China. My sug-
gestion is to add the following paragraph to article 151:
The HKSAR may also conclude relevant interregional agreements
with other Special Administrative Regions or the Mainland China, in
the name of 'HKSAR,' and the conclusion and implementation af-
fairs of the interregional agreements shall be regulated in a special
law enacted by the National People's Congress (or the NPC Standing
Committee).
With respect to the HKSAR Basic Law, another possible way to
smooth conclusion of agreements between the two sides is to interpret
article 151 of the HKSAR Basic Law so that Mainland China may be
included in the concept of regions. 1°4
The third option is to revise the PRC Foreign Trade Law. The newly
revised Foreign Trade Law introduces the terminology of FTA in the Chi-
nese legal system for the first time, thereby providing a legal basis for
negotiating and signing FTAs with foreign states and regions. However,
the Foreign Trade Law does not apply to the separate customs territories
of the PRC, which limits the effect of the Foreign Trade Law with respect
to regional integration, cuts the link between the CEPA and the Foreign
Trade Law, and forfeits a good opportunity to offset the negative effect
caused by the Constitutional lacuna of there being no legal basis for con-
cluding agreements between Mainland China and the HKSAR. In my
view, the application of the Foreign Trade Law to the relations with the
HKSAR is feasible. The PRC has been placing trade relations with the
HKSAR under the framework of foreign trade for many years. For ex-
ample, the MOFTEC, the government agency dealing with the PRC's for-
eign economic and trade affairs as provided by the Foreign Trade Law,
was originally responsible for negotiations of the CEPA with the HK-
SAR. In March 2003, after the adjustment of functions of the MOFTEC,
the agency's name was changed to the MOFCOM,10 5 but its functions
relating to foreign trade, including organizing the CEPA negotiations and
implementation, remain. 10 6 Furthermore, the negotiation and signature
process of the CEPA is consistent with article 48 of the Foreign Trade
Law, which provides that the department responsible for foreign trade,
that is the MOFCOM, shall carry out multilateral and bilateral foreign
trade consultations, negotiations, and dispute settlement. In addition, be-
104. See HKSAR Basic Law, supra note 19, art. 158 (vesting the power of interpreta-
tion of the HKSAR Basic Law in the NPC Standing Committee).
105. See Decision of the First Session of the Tenth National People's Congress on the
Plan for the Institutional Reform of the State Council, GAZETTE OF THE STAND-
ING COMMITrEE OF THE NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONGRESS, Issue No. 2, at 190-194
(2003); see also Notification on the Establishment of Institutions made by the State
Council, GUOFA [2003] No. 8 (2003).
106. See General Office Circular, supra note 89, para. 2(12).
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cause the main aim of the revisions of the 1994 Foreign Trade Law was to
implement China's WTO commitments and to transfer WTO rules into
Chinese domestic law,10 7 if the Foreign Trade Law does not apply to the
HKSAR, how can the PRC implement its WTO commitments and WTO
obligations when dealing with Hong Kong and Macao, both of which are
also WTO members? The non-applicability of the Foreign Trade Law to
the HKSAR will inevitably result in discrimination in applying the PRC
Foreign Trade Law to WTO members, no matter who will be accorded
more favored treatment, Hong Kong or other WTO members, which is
apparently inconsistent with the most favored nation treatment. Lastly,
in my view, if the PRC tries to apply the Foreign Trade Law to its rela-
tions with the HKSAR, it should be borne in mind that the Foreign Trade
Law does not apply to the HKSAR territory, but instead to trade rela-
tions between the PRC and the HKSAR which occur within Mainland
China. Such consideration comes from the due respect to the HKSAR
Basic Law and the high degree of autonomy of the HKSAR.
The fourth option is to have a special law providing negotiation, con-
clusion, ratification, implementation, termination, and interpretation of
interregional agreements between Mainland China and Special Adminis-
trative Regions, or between one Special Administrative Region and an-
other. This special law is not exclusive, but may coexist with other
options.
In sum, the CEPA has no legal basis in existing PRC and HKSAR do-
mestic law. It is necessary, under the framework of "one country, two
systems," to legalize agreements between Mainland China and the HK-
SAR, no matter what their names may be (i.e. quasi-international agree-
ments or interregional agreements). Conferring legal validity on the
CEPA or other interregional agreements would provide their implemen-
tation legal effect (rather than administrative effect from administrative
notifications). More significantly, through legalization of the CEPA, one
of the oldest principles of international law, i.e. pacta sunt servanda, could
be borrowed as a legal obligation with binding effect on two separate
customs territories under one country. From this point of view, to the
extent of one country, the interregional agreement is to be
internationalized.
107. Yu Guangzhou, Vice Minister of the MOFCOM, Address at a news interview,
Apr. 7, 2004, available at http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/200404/
20040400206411_1.xml; see also News Office of the MOFCOM, The Main Contents
and Significance of the Revisions of the Foreign Trade Law, available at http://www.
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